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I. INTRODUCTION

Thirty-five years ago the news was different. Back then, newspapers
earned their reputations and readership through quality journalism.'
Readers chose which paper to read based on its reputation for top news
reporting and its history of uncovering big stories. Reporters like
Woodward and Bernstein could spend months putting facts together
building a story that would captivate the country and put the Washington
Post in the hands of millions for years to come. Things are different now.
Today, if the Washington Post uncovered a monumental story and
published it on its front page, readership would not change. The story
would be on every major news web site in minutes. All the twenty-four
hour news stations would be reporting on the story within the hour. Even
though the other media companies would give the Postcredit for the story,
the advertising revenue would not change hands. No consequential profit
would fall upon the Post for the facts uncovered.
On the other side of the country, things are just as bad. The LA Times
is currently laying off reporters, closing its foreign offices, and firing
editors.2 Media corporation investors are calling for only three national
newspapers, and the industry is falling in line behind them.' However, the
future does not have to be so bleak.
1. See J.Y. Smith & Noel Epstein, Remembering KatherineGraham,WASH. POST CO. (July
18, 2001), availableat http://www.washpostco.com/history-kgraham-obituary02.htm.
2. Frontline:News War PartIII, What's Happeningto the News (PBS television broadcast
Feb. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Frontline:News War], available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/newswar/view/.
3. Id.
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With just a slight change to the current fair use doctrine, the
Washington Postcould recover its loyal readership and reap revenue once
again for its top-caliber news reporting. For twenty-four hours, national
news web sites could state the Post's headlines with a link to the Post's
home page to distribute the information to readers. The same day a story
breaks, evening news channels could pay to license the facts and allow the
Post to recover more profit. The LA Times could reap revenue from its
many reporters while newly self-employed freelance journalists could find
financial success in doing what they do best-researching and writing
stories.
This Article proposes a change to current copyright law to bring more
profit to news reporting. The alteration centers around allowingj ournalists,
and the companies they work for, to own 98% of the investigated and
researched facts they uncover for twenty-four hours after the story is first
published. Part II examines the current state of the media and the effect of
the Internet on the news business. Part I1summarizes the economic and
public policies behind protecting information. Part IV analyzes current
copyright law's protection of information while Part V does the same with
misappropriation law. Part VI describes the proposed amendment to
current copyright law, points out a few legal and practical obstacles to be
resolved, and ultimately concludes that the benefits far outweigh the
potential problems.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MEDIA AND THE INTERNET'S
EFFECT ON THE NEWS BUSINESS

A. Frontline'sNews War
In February 2007, PBS's flagship public affairs show Frontlineaired
a four part series examining the challenges facing mainstream news media
and the news media's reaction.' Frontline producer and correspondent
Professor Lowell Bergman5 drew upon more than eighty interviews with

4. Frontline: News War Introduction (Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter News War Intro],
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/etc/synopsis.html.
5. Lowell Bergman, Professor of Journalism, UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism;
former CBS News "60 Minutes" Senior Executive Producer; recipient of numerous journalism
awards including numerous Emmys, five Alfred I. duPont-Columbia University silver and golden
Baton awards, three Peabodys, a Polk Award, a Sidney Hillman award for labor reporting and the
James Madison Freedom of Information Award for Career Achievement from The Society of
Professional Journalists, http://journalism.berkeley.edu/faculty/bergman/ (last visited Apr. 21,
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key figures in the print, broadcast, and electronic media.6 The results of
this series are staggering and demand that the law adapt to aid this "fourth
branch of [U.S.] government...
Jeff Fager, the Executive Producer of CBS's 60 Minutes, stated that he
is looking to the Internet for his future and that broadcast journalism is
going to end up on the Internet.' "[Y]ou don't see anybody between 20 and
30 getting their news from the evening news," Fager said, "you see them
getting it online." 9 He continued by stating that online advertising figures
are up 30% to 40% each year.'0
Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Google, stated that "[b]eing online is the
future."" While many organizations have only talked about the Internet
revolution, "the fact of the matter is the time is now.' 2 "People who bet
against the Internet, who think that somehow this change is just a
generational shift, miss that it is a fundamental reorganizing of the power
of the end user."' 3 Schmidt concluded his interview by stating that "the
consumption for news is up, but the way in which people consume news
has changed,14 and it's affected newspapers in a business sense pretty
negatively.'
John Carroll, the former editor of the LA Times, estimates that "85
percent of the original reporting that gets done in America gets done by
newspapers," and that "most of the other media that provide news to
people are really recycling news that's gathered by newspapers."' 5 When
describing the business model of the news industry, Carroll stated that the
"typical newspaper makes a 20 percent operating margin. That's roughly
double what the typical Fortune 500 company makes."' 6 The problem,
however, is that profits from newspapers "will vanish over the next few
2007).
6. News War Intro, supra note 4.
7. H.L. Fu & Richard Cullen, Defamation Law in the People's Republic of China, II
TRANSNAT'L LAW 1, 5 (1998) (citing Frederick Schauer, Social Foundation of the Law of
Defamation:A Comparative Analysis, MEDIA L. 263, 264 (1993)).
8. Interview with Jeff Fager, Executive Producer, 60 Minutes (Nov. 29, 2006), available
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/newswar/interviews/Fager.html.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Interview with Eric Schmidt, CEO, Google (Nov. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.phs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/interviews/schmidt.html.
12. Id
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Interview with John Carroll, Former Editor, LA Times (July 8, 2006), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/nwswar/interviews/carroll.html.
16. Id.
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years as the major papers lose advertising dollars to the Web almost as fast
as they're losing readers."' 7
In concluding his investigatory look at the news industry, Professor
Bergman interviewed Charles Bobrinskoy, Vice Chairman of Ariel Capital
Management." According to Bobrinskoy,
the problem is [ ] that the people who are writing the LA Times []
want to be writing about international events. They want to be
writing long-term pieces about why Bush went to war in Iraq. And
we're saying-and the people at the Tribune are saying-there are
other people writing those stories. 19
He then said "there's a role for probably three national newspapers-The
Wall Street Journal,The New York Times, and USA Today. Each has its
own niche; all three are national newspapers. We don't think there's any
demand for a fourth."2
B. Other Media Statistics
The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press is an
independent opinion research group that studies attitudes toward the press,
politics, and public policy issues. 2' In March and April 2004, Pew, in
collaboration with the Project for Excellence in Journalism and the
Committee of Concerned Journalists, conducted a survey of 547 national
and local reporters, editors, and media executives.22 The results of the
survey indicate that "[j]ournalists are unhappy with the way things are
going in their profession., 23 Sixty-six percent of journalists at national

17. Frontline: News War, (PBS television broadcast Feb. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontlinelnewswar/etc/script3.html.
18. "Ariel Capital Management is a privately owned, Chicago-based money management
firm . . . with more than $15.5 billion in assets." Ariel Capital Management, Our History,
http://www.arielcapital.com/content/view/101/1 127 (last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
19. Interview with Charles Bobrinskoy, Vice Chairman, Ariel Capital Management (Oct. 30,
2006) [hereinafter Bobrinsky Interview], availableat http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
newswar/intereviews/bobrinskay.html.
20. Id.
21. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, About the Center, http://peoplepress.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2007).
22. Pew Research Centerforthe Peopleand the Press,Bottom-Line PressuresNow Hurting
Coverage, Say Journalists,May 23, 2004 [hereinafter Bottom-Line Pressures], http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=825.
23. Id.
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media outlets believe that journalism is going in the wrong direction with
iireased bottom line pressure "seriously hurting" the quality of news
coverage. As a comparison, when the same survey was conducted in
1995, only 41% believed bottom-line pressure was hurting news
coverage.25 Finally, the same survey found that there is almost universal
agreement among those who worry about growing financial pressure on
the media to pay less attention to complex stories.26
From April to May 2006, the Pew Research Center conducted its
biennial news-consumption survey among 3204 adults. 7 The results
pertaining to the Internet indicated that nearly one-in-three Americans get
their news online three or more days per week.28 The results also indicated
a trend in online news readership broadening as well as increasing.2 9 In
1996, less than 2% of Americans regularly got their news online; in 2000,
the number was up to 23%; and in 2004, just less than 30% of Americans
read online news three or more days per week.3" Further, the increase in
online news readership is not concentrated in young people.31 In 2000,
30% of Americans between 30 and 34 years old regularly got news
online.32 In 2006, the number was up to 47%.33 For older Americans, in
2000 only 25% of people between the ages of 35 and 49 regularly got
news online, and in 2006, the number was up to 37%.34
The summary of Professor Bergman's "News War" piece and the Pew
research indicates that the standard business model of news gathering is in,
or has gone through, a state of flux. News profits are coming from
different sources, and the industry is trying to adapt. Current investors
realize that news gathering as it is presently understood will not create the
profits media corporations have appreciated in the past; 35 however, the
news and its importance to society has not changed. Fewer news agencies
will result in control over the types of news stories that are investigated

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Online PapersModestly Boost Newspaper Readership, Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press July 30, 2006, available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?
ReportlD=282.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id
32. Online PapersModestly Boost NewspaperReadership,supra note 27.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Bobrinsky Interview, supra note 19.
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and the way in which they are reported.36 In a recent paper for Harvard
University's Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public
Policy, Jill Carroll 37 said this about the future of news reporting:
As citizens in a democracy we have the privilege and obligation
to shape our policies thoughtfully and conscientiously in a direction
we, after informed debate, feel is in our national interest. As a
world power we have a moral obligation to use our influence
responsibly and thoughtfully. This can only happen if the electorate
has enough information upon which to decide what policies most
closely reflect their views and the direction in which they want the
country to go. The media is an important part of making that
happen. The quality of the information provided by the news media
determines to a large extent the quality of the national debate and
resulting policies. Having many sources of good quality, in-depth,
insightful, well-informed [ ] reporting is essential to keeping the
national debate vigorous and churning. This moral argument won't
hold sway in many boardrooms, but the financial incentives to
produce good quality [ ] news should. Hopefully financial decision
makers will have the foresight to realize they are drastically
undervaluing [] news coverage and have the wisdom to hang onto
and invest in this valuable asset.38
If what Carroll says is true, the media will be forced to trust the
foresight of media investors to put the bottom-line aside and do what is
best for the country. If that outcome seems unlikely, then the legislature
must step in and correct the problem before it erodes the electorate's
knowledge and our democracy in general.

36. Menahem Blondheim, RehearsalforMediaRegulation: Congress Versus the TelegraphNews Monopoly, 56 FED. CoMM. L.J. 299, 314-18 (2004) (describing the way in which the
Associated Press controlled national news and the opinions of Americans before Congress stepped
in to break up the monopoly).
37. Reporter, Christian Science Monitor, Fall 2006 Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press,
Politics and Public Policy, Cabot Fellow, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/research_
publications/papers/workingpapers/2007_1 .pdf.
38. Jill Carroll, ForeignNews Coverage: The US. Media's UndervaluedAsset 13-14 (Joan
Shorenstein Ctr. on the Press, Politics & Pub. Policy, Working No. 2007-1, 2007), available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/presspol/research-publications/papers/working-papers/20071 .pdf
(while Ms. Carroll's paper explicitly addresses the importance of foreign news coverage and the
growing trend ofU.S. news organizations to close foreign bureaus, the implications and suggestions
parallel the growing national trend of cutting back on reporting in general).
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III. THE ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC POLICIES BEHIND
PROTECTING INFORMATION

A. Law and Economics on Information in General
Judge Posner 9 explains the unique role of intellectual property with a
simple example.4" Someone who steals the Judge's car deprives him of
valuable property that costs money to acquire.41 The thief pays nothing and
free-rides on the purchase and investment of the car.42 Likewise, if
someone copies the Judge's novel, software, or new molecular entity for
the treatment of disease that was created through considerable expense
including money, time, and risk, the thief has reduced the income of the
work and destroyed the exclusive use of the property.43 But the
correlations are imperfect.' The car thief deprives the Judge of his
property; the copier does not-the Judge would retain it and remain free
to license or sell it.45 While copying may reduce the income from the
work, because of the loss in exclusive use, the reduction may not be
great.' "It may even be zero, if for example the person who 'pirated' [the]
software did so only for his personal use, and not to resell it, and if in
addition he could not have afforded [its] price so that ... not ... even a
single sale" would be lost.47
From Judge Posner's simple example, one can begin to see how
information, and the protection of it, can be much more difficult to explain
than traditional property rights. Information itself is not tangible.4" It can
be put in a tangible form, but recording it in a medium does not change its

39. Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School [hereinafter Judge], http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r.
40. Id
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id
44. Judge, supra note 39.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation:A Dirge, 40 HOuS. L. REV. 621, 622 (2003).
48. Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and CarpenterSignal a
Changing Direction in Intellectual PropertyLaw?, 38 CATH. U.L. REv. 365, 368 n. 18 (1989)
(citing 15 C.F.R. § 379.1 (1988) ("The U.S. export control regulations concerning 'technical data'
recognize this principle. These regulations require an export control license for exchanges of
technical data between U.S. citizens and foreign nationals, without regards to whether the data are
in tangible form (written on paper) or in intangible form (as in oral conversations)")).
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essentially intangible character.4 9 Some scholars describe information as
"infinitely expandable and malleable,"5 while others characterize it as
when a person or persons or tradition ascribes a particular meaning to
data. " In addition, information is inherently "leaky. 5 2 It may be shared
readily by many people through virtually limitless forms and can be
characterized as a public good.53 A resource can be considered a public
good when a current user does not lose anything as new users are added. 4
In contrast, "a private good is a commodity which once consumed by one
person, cannot be consumed by another."5 5 In addition, information itself
is "nonrivalrous."56 Because one person's consumption diminishes
another's, ordinary commodities are "rivalrous. ' 5 7 "However, if one
person uses an idea, it remains undiminished for other users, so ideas are
nonrivalrous."5 8
The public good and nonrivalrous nature of intellectual property in
general, and information in particular, is what makes it such an interesting
subject for economists and lawyers to debate.5 9 "Excluding non-paying

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Information as a Commodity: New
Imperatives of Commercial Law, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 106 (1992) (additionally

characterizing data as "signals, symbols, or at most discrete facts.").
52. Samuelson, supra note 48, at 369.
53. Id.; Rex Y. Fujichaku, The MisappropriationDoctrine in Cyberspace: Protectingthe
Commercial Value of "Hot News" Information, 20 U. HAW. L. REv. 421, 427 (1998) (citing
William M. Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of CopyrightLaw, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
325, 326 (1989) ("A distinguishing characteristic of intellectual property is its 'public good'
aspect")); RICHARD WATr, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY 3 (ed., Edward Elgar Publishing
2000) (1963).
A public good is characterized by admitting more than one user, with no user's
consumption requiring any less consumption by any other user. Information in
general, and intellectual property in particular, is a public good since no current
user possesses any less when new users are added to the set of consumers.
Id.
54. WATT,supra note 53, at 3.
55. Fujichaku, supra note 53, at 427 n.29 (citing PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D.
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 980-81 (13th ed. 1989)).
56. ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONsTrruTION 311 (ed., Princeton Univ. Press
2000) (orig. publication) (explicitly stating that "ideas are nonrivalrous," however, in this context
"information" is synonymous with "idea"); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REv. 257, 283
(2006).
57. COOTER, supra note 56, at 311.
58. Id.
59. WATT,supra note 53, at 3.
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consumers from access to public goods by means of a legal apparatus is
extremely costly" and difficult.6" Additionally, with respect to acts of
speech,6' constitutional guarantees of full freedom maximize its value,
promote vigorous competition, stimulate innovation, and disseminate
ideas.62 Conversely, free-riding on information that has taken expense to
generate will eliminate any incentives to produce the information in the
first place.63 If all consumers were to free-ride, information producing
members of society would dedicate their efforts to other better paid
activities, resulting in the loss of important cultural assets of considerable
social value. 6 "Somewhere between the two extremes [] lies what
economists term a "social optimum," and copyright law is the mechanism
'
that is generally used to attempt to reach this point."65
The U.S. Constitution states "The Congress shall have Power To...
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."66 The intent behind this grant of power, further
discussed later in this article, is that the restrictions on writings,
discoveries, and intellectual property in general actually increase their
supply.67 When inventors, artists, and authors receive property rights in
their creations, the law induces the development and exercise of their
talent and avoids the underproduction of useful ideas and original forms
of expression.68 "Unfortunately, this solution may foster economic
inefficiency of a different sort"-monopolies.69
While consumers regard substitute products as imperfect, the holder of
the property right will confront a downward sloping demand curve for the
right of access to his work. If he wishes to maximize his profits, he will

60. Id.
61. Defined by Black's Law Dictionaryas "[t]he expression or communication of thoughts
or opinions in spoken words; something spoken or uttered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.
2004).
62. COOTER, supra note 56, at 311.
63. Sunder, supra note 56, at 283 ("Because information is assumed by its nature to be
nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, free-riding will eliminate any incentives to produce
information.").
64. WATT, supra note 53, at 4.
65. Id.
66. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
67. COOTER, supra note 56, at 312 ("In the special case of intellectual property, restrictions
on ideas actually increase their supply."); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts:
A Theoryfor the Protectionof Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv: 516, 519 (1981).
68. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the FairUse Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1659,
1700 (1988).
69. Id.
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continue to grant access until the point where the marginal revenue earned
from the access equals the marginal cost." The property owner's technique
will have two economic consequences: first, he will reap monopoly
profits-money, that would have remained with consumers had the work
been priced where the marginal cost of producing it equaled the demand
for it, will now go to the property holder; and second, consumers who
value the work at more than its marginal cost, but less than its monopoly
price, will not buy it.7 Subsequently, a lawmaker who wishes to maximize
efficiency must determine, with respect to each type of intellectual
product, "the combination of entitlements that would result in economic
gains that exceed by the maximum amount the attendant efficiency
losses. 7 2 The "gains" associated with legally granted property rights are
the value to consumers of those intellectual products that would not have
been generated were inventors, artists, and authors not granted those
rights. Stated more simply, "any property rights in excess of those
required to stimulate creative activity are counterproductive."74
B. Law andEconomics and the News
On copyright law in particular, "[t]here is little reason to suspect that
authors of law review articles, road maps, and detective stories will
respond identically to a fixed set of economic stimuli. Thus the Copyright
Act discriminates among broad classes of writings."75 Furthermore, the
Act discriminates on which works to grant property rights to at all. 6 While
John Locke's theories of property state that rights can be .acquired in
something not already owned simply by virtue of the labor expended to
gather or produce, current copyright law disagrees.7 Gathering
information can certainly require labor, and in the context of the news can
be a very expensive, risky, and time consuming task-yet there is no
copyright protection.
As discussed in the next section, current copyright law does not protect
facts or hot news.78 Second-comers can freely utilize the information in a

70. Id. at 1701.
71. Id. at 1702.
72. Id. at 1703.
73. Denicola, supra note 67, at 519.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Samuelson, supra note 48, at 369 (citing J. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§
27-28 (3d ed. 1698)).
78. Fujichaku, supra note 53, at 434.
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news story with total disregard to the high initial costs.79 While the original
information gatherer incurs both the cost of gathering information plus the
cost of reproduction, the second-comer only bears the cost of
reproduction. 0 "Consequently second comers can sell their own products
incorporating the appropriated information at a lower price than that of the
products offered by the original information provider."8 This example
raises an important economic point. It is necessary to distinguish between
the delivery good used to consume the intellectual property and the
informational property itself. "[A] delivery good is not, in general, a public
good, and hence it is easy to establish markets for delivery goods" as
opposed to the information itself.
Within the context of the news business, thirty-five years ago hot news
was consumed through the delivery goods of printed newspapers, radio,
and television. While many people could consume one newspaper, or
listen to a single radio or television broadcast, there were still great
reproduction costs involved in creating the consumable good.
Additionally, time was a big factor.8 2 While radio and television news
broadcasts could be created fairly quickly, consumers would generally
listen or watch the broadcasts at the same time each day. Subsequently,
each individual broadcast company could choose when to release their
story so as not to give competitors time to repeat the broadcast during peak
hours. In the same way, newspapers would keep their hot news private
until it was too late for competitors to write and print in their market until
the next day.83 While time zone changes posed additional hurdles to this
scenario, as discussed later, the news media found a solution.
The largest difference between the description of the news business
thirty-five years ago and the news business today is the twenty-four hour
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 428.
Id.
Id.
See id.at 429.
Just as important as the cheap cost of reproduction is the speed at which copying
is done. A period of time usually exists after the publication or public
dissemination of information before others can appropriate the information for
their own uses. This lead time advantage is a crucial consideration to the original
information provider in estimating the earnings return on its initial investment.

Id.
83. Cf Fujichaku, supra note 53, at 429 ("An information product which has been available
on the market for a significant period of time before commercial rivals are able to copy the
information provided may be better able to recoup investment costs than a product which is copied
soon after its public release.").
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news services. In addition to reproduction time and expense being reduced
for producing delivery goods, the way in which people consume news has
changed. No longer will a headline on the Washington Post cause profits
to rise that day. People will simply consume the news on their usual
arbitrarily chosen homepage, or twenty-four hour news channel, because
the Post's story will inevitably be rewritten and added to the competitor's
feed in minutes. The reproduction costs and time for second-comers to
repeat or copy information in a tangible product are beginning to approach
zero.
In 1970, then Professor, now Supreme Court Justice, Stephen Breyer84
wrote an article describing his opinion of the copyright legislation
Congress was in the process of creating.85 While overly antagonistic of any
increases in copyright protection, he concluded that technological
innovations were reducing the costs of copyright infringement and
conceded that "[tihe copiers cost advantage is fairly large. 86 He went on
to state that even without copyright protection, an initial publisher still
enjoys significant "lead time" advantages over copiers.87 "By the time a
copier chooses a book, prints it, and distributes it to retailers, he may be
six to eight weeks behind, by which time the initial publisher will have
provided retailers with substantial inventories.

88

While very few books

are currently consumed electronically, technology is still moving forward.
If consumers today did not mind reading a book electronically, it is
conceivable that a first publisher's lead time could be as little as only a
few hours within the present state of technology. Would this outcome
change Justice Breyer's opinion on copyright protections?
IV. CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW PROTECTION OF INFORMATION

A. History and OriginalIntent
The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution finds its roots in

84. Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court; former Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School.The Justices of the Supreme Court, Stephen G. Breyer Biography, http://www.supreme
courtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf [hereinafter Breyer's Biography].
85. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,

Photocopies,and Computer Programs,84 HARv. L. REV. 281 (1970).
86. Id. at 296.
87. Id. at 300.
88. Id.
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England with the Statute of Anne (enacted in 1710).9 The goal of the
statute was to encourage learning and ensure that copyright law would not
be used to censor speech by granting authors, rather than printers, the
monopoly on the reproduction of their works."° The framers of the
Constitution "relied on this statute when drafting the Copyright Clause of
our Constitution, which reads, 'The Congress shall have the Power... to
promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to
Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.' 9' In 1790,
"Congress directly transferred the principles from the Statute of Anne into
the copyright law of the United States" by passing the first American
federal copyright statute. 92
The judicial decisions concerning the first federal copyright laws
focused on labor invested in the work.93 The types of work at issue in early
copyright disputes were most often maps, school primers, calendars, and
law books. 94 "No matter how banal the subject matter, if the author's work
resulted from original efforts, rather than from copying preexisting
sources," the author would receive copyright. 95 In an article about early
American copyright law, Professor Jane Ginsburg96 lists the subject matter
of the first few thousand copyright deposits and claims as:
540 newspapers (157 newspapers for 1790-92, 383 for 1798-99),
441 titles in Political Science (207 for 1790-92, 234 for 1798-99),
302 titles in History (117 for 1790-92, 185 for 1798-99), 270 titles
in Social Science (125 for 1790-92, 145 for 1798-99), and 61
Fourth of July orations for 1798-99. By contrast, the publication of
novels appears fairly modest: 43 titles for 1790-92 and 119 for
1798-99. 9'

89. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (1 lth Cir. 2001).
90. Id.; Jane C. Ginsburg, CreationandCommercial Value: Copyright Protectionof Works
ofInformation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1873 n. 29 (1990) ("act is to discourage piracy and is 'for
the Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and Write useful Books"') (citing An Act for the
Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers
of such Copies, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19) [hereinafter Ginsburg I].
91. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1260-61 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
92. Id. at 1261.
93. Ginsburg I, supra note 90, at 1874.
94. Id. at 1873.
95. Id.
96. Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia Law
School.
97. Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights:LiteraryPolicy in Revolutionary France
and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 1002 (1990).
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.The ability to copyright maps illustrates a unique aspect of early
copyright law because maps are much less likely to be granted copyright
today.98 Given the historical context, a likely congressional objective in the
first Copyright Act must have been to reward the labors of those who
chartered unexplored territories." But explorative labor was not a
prerequisite for copyright, since the first Congress also extended the
protection to charts and books which typically borrowed information from
other sources, or demonstrates artistic labor.'° For the first Copyright Act
then, legislative intent was as concerned with "extending copyright
protection to fact works as to works of fancy."''
The original scope of copyright was not as broad as it is today. First,
the original Copyright Act granted authors copyright protection for
fourteen years, with the possibility of renewal for another fourteen
years. 02 In contrast, current copyright law allows protection for the life of
the author plus seventy years after the author's death.0 3 Second,
competing and derivative works as we know them today did not exist.
Early copyright law might forbid a second-coiner's copying from the first
publication, but the law did nothing to stop publishing of a competing
work if the competitor acquired the same information from primary
sources.' Copyright thus protected the first author from thieves but not
against those whose investments into primary sources produced a higher

98. See Amsterdam v. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc., 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951); Key Maps, Inc.
v. Pruitt, 470 F. Supp. 33 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (It should be noted that the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has taken issue with the Third Circuit's decision inAmsterdam. However, even when
map copyrights are sustained, protection will be rather thin. United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d
448, 451 (9th Cir. 1978)).
99. Robert A. Gorman, Factor Fancy? The Implicationsfor Copyright,29 J. Copy. SOC'Y
U.S.A. 560, 564 (1982).
100. Id.
[F]irst-hand exploration and discovery could not likely have been regarded as a
prerequisite to copyright protection, since the first Congress also extended
copyright protection to charts and to books, and it must have been understood that
charts typically borrow and recapitulate information available from other sources,
and that books often recount prosaic themes in a prosaic manner.
Id.
101. Id.

102. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 124.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1998).
104. Ginsburg I, supra note 90, at 1876.
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net yield.'0 5
"By the mid to late nineteenth century, however, courts and
commentators began to offer a different characterization ofauthorship, and
a correspondingly different rationale for copyright coverage."' 16 In two
decisions, The Trademark Cases"7 and Burrows-GilesLithographic Co.
v. Sarony, °8 the Supreme' Court clarified the Constitution's terms of
"authors" and "writings." 09 "Authors" was defined as "he to whom
anything owes its origin,"'" 0 and "writings" was defined as requiring
originality."' Further cases "viewed authorship as an emanation of the
author's personality... protectable because it incorporates... its creator's
113
unique individuality."". 2 Originality, the "'sine qua non of copyright,"
thus changed from centering on the independence of the author's labors to
the distinctiveness of the work's conception."' "Subjective judgment,
rather than diligent collection, would be the locus of the work's
originality."'' It would be misleading, however, to say that the labor
oriented approach had been abandoned. The two views continued to
coexist, and
at times even worked together into the early twentieth
6
century." 1
By the late 1960s, Congress began deliberations over proposed
legislative changes to the U.S. Copyright Act.' There was extensive
debate over how comprehensive the changes should be, especially on the
subject of increased protection and duration." 8 The debates lasted for close
to a decade before the 1976 Act was passed, which controls copyright law
today.
As a proponent of reducing copyright protection, Justice Stephen
Breyer argued in a paper published in the Harvard Law Review that the

105. Id. at 1877.
106. Id. at 1874.
107. Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).

108. Burrows-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
109. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
110. Burrows-Giles Lithographic, 111 U.S. at 58.
111. Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.

112. Ginsburg I, supra note 90, at 1874.
113. Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. at 345.
114. Ginsburg I, supra note 90, at 1874.

115. Id.
116. Id.("The two views continued to coexist; indeed, sometimes they have been collapsed:
if the author did not copy the work from a prior source, the work must be "his own" and therefore
original.").
117. Breyer, supra note 85, at 284.
118. Id.
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case for expanding copyright law had not been made." 9 The paper
described his research and analysis, ultimately concluding that the data did
not support a benefit of copyright in books. 120 He suggested that to
"abolish protection would not produce a very large or very harmful decline
in... book production.'' Instead, he stated that abolition of copyright
"should benefit some readers by producing lower prices, eliminating the
cost ...to copy, and increasing the circulation of the vast majority of
books that would continue to be produced.' ' 122 Despite Professor Breyer's
opinion, however, Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976, modifying
the previous 1909 version slightly. 23 The modifications included: (1) an
increase in the length of copyright protection; (2) removal of the copyright
renewal requirements;' 24 (3) codification of the previous common law
concept that ideas are not copyrightable;' 25 and (4) introduction of a
doctrine known as "fair use," which ' explicitly allowed the use of
copyrighted works for "news reporting. 126
This fourth change of the 1976 Act dates back to the years of the
Trademark Cases, in the mid-nineteenth century, when federal courts

119. Breyer, supranote 85, at 284.
120. Id. at 321.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. L. David McBride, Copyright: Same Song, Different Verse: Parodyas Fair Use After
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 48 OKLA. L. REv. 627, 629 (1995) ("The current law of
copyright is controlled by the Copyright Act of 1976.... The 1976 version of the Act modified
slightly the 1909 version.").
124. Id.
125. Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981).
The idea-expression dichotomy was given express statutory recognition in the
1976 Copyright Act. Section 102(b) provides: "In no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such a
work."
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2007)). Despite the fact that the idea and expression distinction was
not part of the previous 1909 Copyright Act, the legislative history may indicate that Congress did
not intend to change the scope of current common law copyright law. On the subject of the idea and
expression provision, the legislative history states: "Its purpose is to restate, in the context of the
new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea
remains unchanged." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 5659, as reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5670.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2007).
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began to hold that conduct seemingly prohibited by the copyright statute
did not give rise to liability. 12 7 In the early cases, whether the defendant's

conduct constituted a "fair use" was not always differentiated from
whether there was copyright infringement; however, by the mid-twentieth
century, courts began to more consistently hold that "fair use" was a
distinct affirmative defense to acts of copyright infringement.'28 After the
doctrine was established in U.S. Copyright Code, federal courts continued
to mold129the law without guidance from the Supreme Court until the mid
1980s.

B. Current Copyright Law
Current copyright law allows original works of authorship to receive
protection immediately upon their creation.' 30 The basic requirements for
protection are that the work must fall within the scope of copyright law,
must be original, and must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression.' 3 '
Compared to patent law, the requirements are not nearly as stringent, and
"the duration of copyright protection is much longer than the term of
patent protection.' 3 2 The current objectives of copyright are: (1) to
advance social utility by increasing the supply of intellectual products and
facilitating their distribution; (2) to enforce the author's natural rights to
recovering the fruits of his labor; (3) to protect the author's interest in
portraying the way his creations are presented to the world;33 and (4) to
align the law with society's conceptions of decent behavior. 1
Beyond these inherent objectives and explicit requirements is where
copyright law has been molded by the opinions of federal courts. In Feist
Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., the Supreme Court
reviewed the history of copyright case law to better understand the
intentions behind whether or not a phone book's alphabetical listings were

127. Fisher III, supra note 68, at 1662-63.
128. Id. at 1663.
129. Id.(explaining how the Supreme Court's equal division in the Justice's votes prevented
the issuance of a Fair Use decision until the Sony Corp. v. UniversalCity Studios and Harper&
Row Publishersv. Nation Enterprisescases).

130. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in IntellectualPropertyLaw, 75 TEx.
L. REv. 989, 1013 (1997).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Fisher III,
supranote 68, at 1668-69 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (U.S. 1984); Harper& Row Publishers,471 U.S. 539 (1985) (paying attention
to these underlying goals, the Supreme Court has suggested, would facilitate both the interpretation
of the factors enumerated above and identification of other appropriate criteria in future cases.)).
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copyrightable.'
The Court, referencing The Trademark Cases and
Burrows-Giles discussed earlier, stated the "[W]ritings which are to be
protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of
' The Court went on to conclude
books, prints, engravings, and the like."135
from these cases that "one who discovers a fact is not its 'maker' or
'originator."" 36
Oddly, the most recent Supreme Court case cited in the Feistopinion
was Harper& Row, Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,"'in which the
Court granted a biography publisher the right to recover from a magazine
publisher who had printed a 300-word excerpt of facts, from the biography
of President Ford, before it was released. 138 The Harperopinion included
statements about how the monopoly created by copyright "applies equally
to works of fiction and nonfiction," and how the monopoly rights granted
to the biography served their "intended purpose of inducing the creation
of new material of potential historical value."' 39 While the opinion also
included statements that facts are not copyrightable, 4 ° it concluded by
stating "copyright assures those who write and publish factual narratives
...
that they may at least enjoy the right to market the original expression
contained therein as just compensation for their investment......
The contradictorily applied precedent in Feist has caused some
observers to state that "[t]here is room for argument that the Feist court
misapplied prior Supreme Court interpretations of the Patent-Copyright
Clause."' 14 2 Specifically, The Trademark Cases' "intellectual labor"
requirement for a "Writing" might be satisfied by the "identification and
assembly of information into a compilation, without regard to the
subjectivity of the selection or arrangement."' 43 Additionally, in BurrowsGiles, the "author" to whom a work "owes its origin," could be the maker
of a compilation of information, without regard to creativity.'" Overall,
however, neither of the late nineteenth century decisions address the scope

134. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 347.
137. Id. at 345.
138. Id. at 340.
139. Harper& Row Publishers,471 U.S. at 546.
140. Id. at 547.
141. Id. at 556-57.
142. Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protections of Works of
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 338, 374 (1992) [hereinafter
Ginsburg II].
143. Id.
144. Id.
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of copyright protection, and thus should not be used to support a
constitutional limitation of a copyright claim.' 45
In addition to the older copyright cases, in Harper and Feist the
Supreme Court cited the provision of the new 1976 Copyright Act that
provided that ideas are not copyrightable. 46
' This provision explicitly states
that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea. .. or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, illustrated, or embodied.' 4 7 While this focus on the
Act is more reasonable than the Court relying on ambiguous case law from
the nineteenth century, it remains unclear why if Congress intended that
facts not be copyrighted, they simply would not say "in no case does
copyright protection extend to facts." The legislative history behind the
new section included in the 1976 Act only adds to the confusion, because
it states that the purpose of the section "is to restate, in the context of the
new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between
expression and idea," and to leave it "unchanged."' 48 Thus, in order to
determine the legislative intent, one may look at the federal common law
before 1976 as it applies to ideas, expressions, and facts.
In 1950, the Seventh Circuit held in Toksvig v. Bruce PublishingCo.
that an author's research into the life of Hans Christian Anderson, from
almost exclusively Danish primary sources over the course of three years,
should be copyrightable. 14 9 Specifically, the court found infringement
when a subsequent author spent less than a year researching English
sources, including plaintiffs book, to write her own book about
Anderson's life. 150 While the court's ruling could be justified on the
explicit copying of twenty-four passages,' 5' the holding is much broader
and clearly states that the plaintiff biographer had a protectable interest in
her research.' 52

145. Id. There is also considerable legislative precedent for expansive congressional
interpretation of copyright terms based on the Plant Patent Act. See id. at 376-77 (discussing
Congress interpreting the definitions of "Inventor" and "Discoveries" in the Patent Clause to still
allow individuals to obtain patents in asexually reproducible plants they may have simply come
upon).
146. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 356 (1991) ("Section
102(b) is universally understood to prohibit any copyright in facts."); Harper& Row Publishers,
471 U.S. at 556.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2007).
148. H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 56, as reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670.
149. Toksvig v. Bruce Publ'g Co., 181 F.2d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 1950).
150. Id. at 666-67.
151. Id. at666.
152. Id.
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In 1966, the Second Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit's Toksvig
holding in its Rosemount Enterprises,Inc. v. Random House, Inc. opinion
1 The Seventh Circuit had
concerning the biography of Howard Hughes. 53
received criticism in its holding,154 but in 1981, the Fifth Circuit
additionally chose to follow the Second Circuit in Millerv. UniversalCity
Studios, Inc., when deciding a case on a television film based on a nonfictional book about a kidnapping. 55 The Fifth Circuit stated that the
"issue is not whether granting copyright protection to an author's research
would be desirable or beneficial, but whether such protection is intended
under the copyright law."' 56 It is interesting that the Fifth Circuit would
have made such a comment, however, because they were working under
the 1976 Copyright Act, and even cited its legislative history 5 7 concerning
on previous federal
the provision on the copyright of ideas being
15 8based
court case law which was split on this issue.
On the subject of news reporting specifically, the fair use doctrine of
the 1976 Copyright Act may pose an explicit limitation on any recovery
for infringement. Section 107 states "the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies ... for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting,teaching.., or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.' ' 159 Because of this provision, even if a court
was to hold and find that the facts of a news story are copyrightable, if a
subsequent news writer used them it would most likely be considered a
"fair use."
To determine whether a use is fair, the Act lists four factors for courts
to consider: "(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature, or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used... ; and (4) the effect of the use on the
potential market ....16 0When considering whether a subsequent nonresearched, copied news story is a "fair use," courts may find that the
reasons listed for determining fair use actually cut against a subsequent
reporter. If,for example, the second user found the story online and posted
a rewritten form on a large commercial site, the use would be commercial

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Rosemount Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966).
Gorman, supra note 99, at 588-89.
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (1981).
Id.at 1369.
Id. n.2.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2007) (emphasis added).
Id.
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to attract web surfers to the web page thereby increasing traffic and
advertising revenue, would steal the facts or "heart" of the news story,
would take the whole news story as opposed to just a headline, and would
decrease the web traffic on the original author's web page. While these
arguments seem probable, no plaintiff has ever brought a case for
infringement of its news story, and the explicit listing in the Act that "news
reporting" is allowed undercuts the argument greatly. 161In cases in which
liability has been shrunken or limited by the fair use doctrine to produce
a seemingly unfair result, some commentators have called for a "reverse
fair use doctrine," where liability would be expanded when the rationale
for copyright
protection is confounded by a loophole in the copyright
62
statute.1
In review, the more recent NBA v. Motorola, Inc., Second Circuit
opinion best summarizes the current national judicial opinion over the
copyright of facts: "[t]he 'fact/expression dichotomy' is a bedrock
principle of copyright law that 'limits severely the scope of protection in
fact-based works... [n]o author may copyright facts or ideas. '163 For this
reason, in order to grant news reporters copyright in their researched
stories for twenty-four hours, Congress would have to amend the
Copyright Act. The most logical way to accomplish such a change would
be to simply add a line in the fair use doctrine to clarify that the idea and
expression provisions do not apply to hot news facts, and to then note that
hot news stories would not be subject to the fair use provision for twentyfour hours after they are first published. Despite the previous case law
concerning facts and congressional intent, "the Constitution as we know
authorizes Congress to create copyright, but leaves the details to

161. Paradoxically, it should be noted that for fictional works, the only allowable fair use is
one of parody or comment.
162. Posner, supra note 47, at 633.
We could think of liability in such a case as based on a "reverse fair use" doctrine.
Fair use shrinks liability in some cases of copying; the reverse doctrine would
expand liability when the rationale for copyright protection was present but a
possible loophole in the copyright statute threatened to allow the defendant to
avoid liability.
Id.
163. NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 356 (1991); Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (listing the rule improperly by saying "fact/expression dichotomy"
instead of the correct "idea/expression dichotomy").
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Congress,' 16 "whatever the Supreme Court's prior interpretations of the
Patent-Copyright Clause, Congress may nonetheless supply the content of
' and change it as they see fit.
that clause"165

V. MISAPPROPRIATION AND OTHER STATE LAW
PROTECTION OF INFORMATION

A. A BriefHistory of Misappropriation
In addition to the potential protection of information offered by federal
copyright law, state laws may offer protection as well. The most applicable
doctrine is the tort of misappropriation initially created by the Supreme
Court in the now extinct federal common law.'66 The first case to
recognize misappropriation was International News Service (INS) v.
AssociatedPress.'67
The INS dispute arose during World War I between two competitors
who gathered and sold news to newspapers: the Associated Press (AP) and
the International News Service (INS). 16 8 During the early part of the war,
William Randolph Hearst, who owned INS, sympathized with the
Germans.' 6 9 Because of Hearst's sympathies, British censors prevented
INS correspondents in England from sending dispatches of the war to

164. WILuAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 107 (2003).
165. Ginsburg II, supra note 142, at 375.
Even if Congress cannot claim ultimate authority to interpret those portions of the
Constitution that bear neither on separation of powers nor on individual rights,
Congress should enjoy substantial discretion in implementing its constitutional
prerogative to "promote the Progress of Science." Congress' determination of
what endeavors constitute the "Writings" of "Authors" should be viewed as an
exercise of fact-finding by the body most competent to evaluate the efficacy of the
means chosen to promote the constitutional goal.
Id.
166. At the time the misappropriation doctrine was recognized, federal courts sitting in
diversity jurisdiction over a state law claim were free to apply, or create, federal common law to
the case. However, in 1938 the Supreme Court overturned Swift v. Tyson, and henceforth required
all federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction over a state law claim to apply state common law
to the case. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
167. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 238 (1918).
168. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 164, at 105.

169. Id.
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America. 7 ' INS was subsequently forced to copy AP's dispatches when
supplying its subscribers with news.' 71 While, for the most part, INS
employees obtained the news in a lawful manner (generally by purchasing
early editions of AP newspapers),' 72 there were instances of reporters
clandestinely reading AP bulletin boards and copying AP dispatches
verbatim.' 73
There were no elements of copyright infringement raised in AP's suit
against INS, however, in Justice Pitney's majority opinion in favor of AP,
he stated that there was a "quasi-property" interest in the news, created by
the "expenditure of labor, skill, and money," which gave AP the right to
prevent a competitor from using it.' 74 He reasoned that a "purchaser of a
single newspaper [could] spread knowledge of its contents gratuitously, for
any legitimate purpose not unreasonably interfering with [AP's] right to
make merchandise of it... but to transmit that news for commercial use,
in competition ...is a very different matter."' 75 He then stated that INS
was "endeavoring to reap where it has not sown.., and a court of equity
ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair competition in
business."' 76
The Supreme Court sustained the injunction of the lower court and
allowed AP to protect its investment by preventing INS from copying
news items for an undefined period, until which AP could realize its
177
investment and all commercial value in the news had "passed away."'
The Court justified its recognition of the new misappropriation law on
three distinct reasons: (1) a labor theory of property; (2) commercial
immorality; and (3) the preservation of the incentive to invest in
information gathering. 17 The first justification of misappropriation has a
direct link to the natural rights "sweat of the brow" rationalization for
intellectual property law in general. 179 Despite the intangible nature of

170. Id.; Fujichaku, supra note 53, at 440.
171. LANDES & POSNER, supranote 164, at 105; Douglas G.Baird, Common Law Intellectual
Propertyandthe Legacy ofinternational News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411,
412 (1983).
172. Baird, supra note 171, at 412.
173. Samuelson, supra note 48, at 388.
174. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.at 245-46; Fujichaku, supra note 53, at 441-42.
178. Fujichaku, supra note 53, at 442.
179. Id.
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news, it still takes time and labor to gather and thus has value. The second
justification, outlining the commercially immoral aspect of INS's tactics,
"functions as a form of unfair competition law punishing the commercially
immoral conduct of competitors." 8 ' Finally, the preservation of incentive
to invest justification of misappropriation law, exemplifies the Court's
value in news and the risks of not "plac[ing] the daily events of the world
at the breakfast table of [ ] millions."''
No summary of the INS decision is complete without addressing the
separate concurring opinion of Justice Holmes and the dissent of Justice
Brandeis. While agreeing with the majority's decision, Holmes rejected a
broad interpretation of INS-style misappropriation by the courts.' 82 He
stated that the only ground of complaint that should be recognized, without
legislation, is the implied misstatement of INS in not citing that its
information came from AP.'83 He concluded "that within the limits
recognized by the decision of the Court the defendant [INS] should be
enjoined from publishing news obtained from the Associated Press forhours after publication by the plaintiff unless it gives express credit to the
Associated Press."' 184
As for Justice Brandeis' dissent, while in agreement with the majority
that INS had acted unjustly toward AP, he simply disagreed that judicial
creation of a property right in news was an appropriate response.' 85
Although the common law had in the past created new rules to deal with
new situations, Justice Brandeis thought that this situation so severely
affected the public interest that a judicial approach was dangerous.186 He

The Court claimed a "quasi property" interest in breaking news which AP
expended resources and money to procure. This interest inured to AP because of
the time and resources spent by AP to gather the news which is a direct link to the
labor theory of property, wherein property rights are deserved out of respect for
a person's expended labor. INS therefore could not permissibly "reap where it has
not sown"; the rationale for misappropriation liability thereby has a direct link to
the natural rights, "sweat of the brow" justification of copyright.
Id.
180. Id. at442.
181. Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 235.
182. Id. at 247 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 248.
184. Id. (reasoning that if INS subscribers realized INS was gathering news from the AP, they
would change news services to gather the news sooner).
185. Samuelson, supra note 48, at 393.
186. Id.;Int'lNews Serv., 248 U.S. at 232 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Justice Brandeis simply
disagreed that judicial creation of a property right in news was an appropriate response. More was
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"charged that the majority opinion ignored the public's interest in the
dissemination of news, ' and that incases like this, laws affecting new
property interests must be weighed by public policy
and defined by the
legislature in the patent and copyright statutes.' 88
B. ContemporaryApplications of MisappropriationLaw
Despite the extinguishment of federal misappropriation common law
by the Erie Doctrine twenty years after it was created, the doctrine of
misappropriation "has blossomed in state courts.' 89 In Twentieth Century
Sporting Club v. TransradioPress Service, 9 ° the Supreme Court of New
York cited the doctrine of misappropriation to prevent an unlicensed
eavesdropper from restating the commentary of a licensed ringside
announcer.' 9' In McCord Co. v. L.A. Plotnick,192 the California Second
District Court of Appeal utilized the misappropriation doctrine to halt
publication of bank credit rates, copied from a trade newspaper.' 93 In
Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc.,194 the Ninth Circuit, acting in diversity
jurisdiction, found a radio station liable for lifting breaking news accounts
in newspapers. 9'
The doctrine essentially remained as it was created in AP v. INS until
the 1964 Supreme Court Sears-Compco196 decisions, in which, the
Supreme Court indicated that state law prohibitions against copying could

at stake in the case than righting an injustice. To give relief required more than the application of
old rules to new facts; it required making a new rule.").
187. Id.at 393-94.
188. Id.
"Upon these incorporeal productions the attribute of property is continued after
such communication only in certain classes of cases where public policy has
seemed to demand it," and then only when the legislature has undertaken to define
the boundaries of such rights, as in the patent and copyright statute. In Justice
Brandeis' opinion, the injustice perpetrated by INS should have been righted, if
at all, by the legislature.
Id. (citing Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 250).
189. Ginsburg II, supra note 142, at 355.
190. 300 N.Y.S. 159 (1937).
191. Id.at 161.
192. 239 P.2d 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951).
193. Id.
194. 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935), rev'dfor lack ofjurisdiction, 299 U.S. 269 (1936).
195. Id.
196. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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conflict with the constitutional and congressional intent of free access to
works left unprotected by federal law.' 97 In each case, the Court reversed
a decision under state unfair competition laws that prohibited the copying
of unpatentable light fixtures.198 While the Court's opinion explicitly
outlawed states from providing patent-like protection to unpatentable
items, it stated that states were still allowed to prevent consumer deceit by
imposing liability upon those who deceive the public by palming off their
copies as originals.' 99 Applied broadly, the language in Sears-Compco
strongly suggested that protection of intellectual property under state law
would be preempted whenever it conflicted, even indirectly, with the
objectives of federal copyright and patent laws." ° Applied more narrowly
to copyright law, the Court seemed to be saying that state misappropriation
claims would only be allowed where competitors had not cited their source
of information.
Less than ten years later, the Court addressed state copyright claims
2 1 in which, "the Court held that each
directly in Goldstein v. California,
individual state could have unique interests in protecting certain
intellectual property under state copyright laws, as long as those state laws
did not interfere with federal copyright laws., 20 2 "The Court distinguished
the Sears-Compco line of cases on the grounds that those cases dealt with
state patent protection in an area Congress had specifically decided not to
regulate. 2 °3 The next year, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,2 4 the
Court clarified its holding in Goldstein and explicitly stated "that the states
were free to make trade secret legislation in any area that Congress had
chosen not to regulate."2 5 It concluded that "[t]he only limitation on the
States is that in regulating the area of patents and copyrights they do not
conflict with the operation of the laws in this area passed by Congress. 20 6
Subsequently, "Goldstein and Kewanee permit state regulation of

197. David E. Shipley & Jeffrey S. Hay, Protecting Research: Copyright, Common-Law
Alternatives, and FederalPreemption, 63 N.C.L. REV. 125, 152 (1984).
198. Id. (citing Sears, 376 U.S. at 225-27, 233 and Compco, 376 U.S. at 234-35, 239).
199. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
200. Shipley & Hay, supranote 197, at 153.
201. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
202. Heather Richtarcsik, Misappropriationin MassachusettsandAround the Country:How
Technology will Utilize this Tort, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 717, 736 (2001).
203. Id.
204. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
205. Richtarcsik, supra note 202, at 737.
206. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479.
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intellectual
property unless it conflicts with the objectives of federal
207
law.
Two years after Kewanee, Congress passed the 1976 Copyright Act
which addressed the issue of state law preemption directly. 2°8 Section 301
states "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright. . . are governed
exclusively by this title. 2 °9 The Act goes on to list four specific examples
where preemption should not exclude state protection.210 While the statute
does not address the issue of preemption with respect to state
misappropriation claims directly, the legislative history may elucidate
congressional intent.
The House committee report concerning the proposed preemption
section addition to the Copyright Act stated:
state law should have the flexibility to afford a remedy (under
traditional principles of equity) against a consistent pattern of
unauthorized appropriation by a competitor of the facts (i.e., not the
literary expression) constituting "hot" news, whether in the
traditional mold of InternationalNews Service v. AssociatedPress,
248 U.S. 215 (1918), or in the newer form of data updates from
scientific, business, or financial data bases.2 '
While seemingly clear that the new preemption section would not apply
to state misappropriation claims, this portion of the legislative history
pertains to a version of the bill which specifically would have listed
various "unpreempted" actions including misappropriation. 212 The bill
which actually passed deleted misappropriation as a state cause of action
expressly saved from preemption.2"3 Subsequently, the question remains

207. Shipley & Hay, supra note 197, at 154.
208. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1998) (crediting Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2572 (1976).
209. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1998).
210. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (b) (1998) (Specific examples of unpreempted state regulations include:
(1)regulations involving subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright,
including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression; (2) any cause of
action arising from events occurring before January 1, 1978; (3) activities violating legal and
equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright; and (4) state and local landmarks, historic preservation, zoning, or building codes,
relating to architectural works protected under section 102(a)(8)). Id.
211. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), as reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.
212. Denicola, supra note 67, at 517 n.7.
213. Id.
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whether Congress intended an INS-type state cause of action to be allowed,
or if such a cause of action was specifically excluded.
C. MisappropriationPreemptionAfter the Copyright Act of 1976
Section 301 of the Copyright Act requires preemption when a state
regulation: (1) concerns a work of authorship that is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression; (2) covers copyrightable subject matter as defined
by the copyright statute; and (3) creates legal and equitable rights
equivalent to those within the general scope of the Copyright Act. 14 Since
the statute clearly outlines when preemption should occur, courts should
be able to turn to the explicit language of the statute to determine whether
a state law is preempted.21 5
The first requirement, fixation in some tangible medium of expression,
will almost always be satisfied by the inherent requirements of information
dissemination. 216 The second condition, for a state law misappropriation
claim to be preempted by federal law, would most likely be satisfied as
well.21 7 While academics have debated over this question at length,1 8
misappropriation protection of information falls within the subject matter
of copyright because works of authorship, which include ideas and facts,
are mentioned as copyrightable subject matter in section 102(b). 219 "Lack
of originality will cause the factual elements of an informational work to
be uncopyrightable, but the informational product itself will still be
considered copyright subject matter for preemption purposes. 220
Interpreting the subject matter requirement differently would allow state
law protection of unoriginal and uncopyrightable works.22 ' Some courts
have held
that such a result would "nullify the preemption provision
222
itself.,

214. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
215. Fujichaku, supra note 53, at 463.
216. Id. ("Fixation may be in print, on a web page displayed on a computer screen, or in
computer media.").
217. Contrast Denicola, supra note 67, at 542 n.7, with Fujichaku, supra note 53, at 463.
218. Contrast Denicola, supra note 67, at 542 n.7, with Fujichaku, supra note 53, at 463.
219. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2007).
220. Compare Fujichaku, supra note 53, at 463, with Denicola, supra note 67, at 517 n.7
("copyright does not extend to facts per se, they are outside the subject matter of copyright and thus
state protection is not preempted. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][2][b]
(1978).).
221. Fujichaku, supra note 53, at 464.
222. Id. (citing Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv. Inc., 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d 1980)).
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The third provision, requiring misappropriation claims to create legal
and equitable rights equivalent to those within the Copyright Act, is easily
met as well.223 State claims explicitly bar competitors from unfair
borrowing and provide monetary damages for misappropriated
information. 24 These remedies and rights are equivalent to those in section
106 of the copyright statute.22 5
Unfortunately, while this method of statutory interpretation concerning
the survival of misappropriation from preemption seems obvious, courts
have routinely found it to be inadequate and confusing.22 6 In response to
the confusion, some courts have adopted the "extra element" test.227 Under
this test, if "an 'extra element' is 'required instead of or in addition to the
acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display, in order to
constitute a state-created cause of action, then the right does not lie within
the general scope of copyright and there is no preemption."' 228 A more
recent Second Circuit decision cited this test and questioned in dicta "the
extent to which a 'hot-news' misappropriation claim based on INS
involves extra elements and is not the equivalent of exclusive rights under
a copyright., 229 In concluding that "some form of such a claim survives
preemption, '23 ° the court improperly relied on the legislative intent and
committee reports of the Copyright Act discussed earlier. Since the
Supreme Court has not discussed this issue, and no court has addressed it
directly in its holding, the answer is still unknown.
Two broader arguments regarding whether the Copyright Act preempts
state misappropriation claims are (1) that the implicit policy of the Act
reveals a federal strategy favoring free copying of information and (2) that
the Patent-Copyright Clause of the Constitution implies a rejection of state
authority to offer parallel protection.231 With respect to the former
argument, commentators have stated that by declaring facts outside the
subject matter of copyright in section 102(b), Congress intended that facts
are free to be copied, and that no court is to construe the federal copyright
monopoly to inhibit that freedom. 232 The implication for state laws is that

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
NIMAER,

229.
230.
231.
232.

Fujichaku, supra note 53, at 464.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 467.
Id.
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting
supra note 220, § 1.01[B], at 1-14-15).
Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 850 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id.
Ginsburg II, supra note 142, at 361-62.
Gorman, supra note 99, at 604.
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if Congress intends federal law to allow facts to be freely copied, state law
cannot usurp the national policy.2"'
In summary, it seems clear that there is no standardized national policy
of whether state laws concerning the misappropriation of facts are
preempted by federal copyright laws. Additionally, with respect to national
news specifically being misappropriated on the Internet, it is obvious that
individual state misappropriation laws will not provide clear messages to
large media corporations. There needs to be a uniform national statute
controlling the usage of non-researched publicly available facts in secondcomer news stories.
D. Other State Law Protectionof Information
Other proposed state law remedies for the protection of information
include the breach of an express or implied-in-fact contract. These
remedies should withstand preemption but would likely pose additional
problems. "A breach of contract claim must establish an agreement
involving a quidpro quo, performance by the plaintiff of all conditions
precedent, and breach of the contract by the defendant."234 Because these
elements are different from the elements of an infringement action, the
contract action would not be seen as equivalent and should escape section
301 preemption.2 35 A contract claim could be filed in situations where
authors required users to pay for the use of materials even though the facts
and research were in the public domain.236 If users violated the express use
of the materials, and thus the contract, users could be forced to pay
penalties for the improper use or dissemination of materials.237 While this
scenario seems promising, it is unclear how difficult it would be to track
the millions of users on an Internet news web site, how information may
be disseminated
to competitors, and how to determine which state's laws
238
apply.
would

233. Id.
234. Shipley & Hay, supra note 197, at 171.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 171-72.
237. Id.
238. For a greater discussion ofstate contract claims used as an alternative to misappropriation
for the protection of information, see Shipley & Hay, supra note 197, at 152.
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VI. RESTRICTING FAIR USE TO SAVE THE NEWS
A. The ProposedChange to CopyrightLaw
Justice Holmes's concurrence in AP v. INS states that a proper remedy
for the AP against INS would be to enjoin INS "from publishing news
obtained from the Associated Press for-hours after publication ... the
' Building on this
number of hours.., to be settled by the District Court."239
idea, this Article proposes a change in current copyright law to allow
reporters and the newspapers or companies they work for to find profit in
"hot news" gathering. By giving reporters the rights to a very time-limited
monopoly in their stories and investigative reporting, news agencies will
find additional profits in news gathering and subsequently increase the
amount of news gathering and reporting overall. 211 "In general,
the law
241
supply.
their
increase
that
ideas
on
restrictions
allow
should
Since federal misappropriation common law (including the AP v. INS
decision) is now extinct, 242 and current state misappropriation law would
be preempted if it were to overreach into federal copyright law,243 the only
way to grant protection to news reporters would be an amendment to the
current Copyright Act. The best place to make the change would be in
section 107, the fair use provision, because it already allows "fair use of
a copyrighted work ...for purposes such as... news reporting. ,244 The
change could be subtle, only allowing the fair use provision of the
Copyright Act to include news reporting twenty-four hours after its

239. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(while Justice Holmes's concurrence discussed allowing INS to continue its use of the Associated
Press stories if express credit was given, his focus was on the unfairness in the timeline of readers
purchasing news from the first and most easily accessible source, and where the profits from that
purchase should go).
240. See COOTER, supranote 56, at 312 ("copyright and patent law grant creators the right of
exclusive use of their creation for a fixed period of time. Much like temporary monopoly, exclusive
use-rights can create extraordinary profits.").
241. Id.
242. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling earlier precedent, and
holding that there is no federal general common law, thus confining the federal courts to act only
as interpreters of law originating elsewhere).
243. Supra text accompanying notes 212-231. Additionally, commentators have cited the
inability of misappropriation law to deal with protection of information properly. Fujichaku, supra
note 53, at 475 ("Common law misappropriation, because of its potential to interfere with access
to public domain material, its discredited sweat of the brow theoretical justification, and its general
amorphous nature, should be abolished in favor of a national statutory system which would take
into account these concerns.").
244. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2007).
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original publication, or the change could be major, including a whole new
section of copyright law concerning news reporting.
Either way, the amended provision should include these key points: (1)
the protection would not extend to traditional news headlines-to allow
third parties the ability to advertise a competitors story and link to it;245 (2)
the protection would only last for twenty-four hours-so that after a
reporter has realized a profit in his story, the story could subsequently be
reproduced freely to allow the dissemination of ideas; and (3) the
reporter's rights in the story could not be used to restrict a purely nonprofit
organization from posting the story.2' As with all laws, the enforcement
and refinement of their meaning must come from the courts, with clear
legislative intent from Congress as a guide. The legislative intent in this
case would be clear in that Congress would be legislating to encourage
news reporting by allowing reporters temporary rights in their stories, yet
still allowing the dissemination of ideas by making the monopoly rights
temporary and not comprehensive.
The difficulty in the details of the law would be particular verbiage to
determine which reporter discovered what facts, and what constitutes first
publishing for a grant of twenty-four hour rights. Because of this
foreseeable problem, Congress and the courts may decide that the plaintiff
has the burden of proving that the story was uncovered through their
inimitable research, and that they published the story first. Additionally,
to reduce the risk of increased litigation precluding publishers from
publishing stories that might be borderline, the maximum amount of
damages could be set at the cost of litigation plus the amount of profits the
defendant gained from publishing the story during the time the plaintiff
had monopoly rights to it.
As a result of these constraints, the only likely impact the law would
have is to prevent the rewriting and dissemination of the type of large
investigative stories that are published on average less than a dozen times
per year. Additionally, with the requirement that the story be researched,
one could not claim rights in a matter-of-fact story like a building fire or
earthquake. However, if a reporter were to research a specific rescue
operation associated with a large catastrophe that was not known to
another similarly situated second reporter, the first reporter could gain
temporary rights to the story.

245. Thus a news web site like CNN.com could post a headline describing the story in brief,
and then link readers to whatever web site has the monopoly rights to the story.
246. An example of this third scenario would include a blogger commenting on the story, or
even posting it on a web page. It would not include a company like Google who makes advertising
dollars to post the story on their web page.
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To better understand the implications, the proposed change can be
envisioned by comparing potential worlds of copyright-law-extremes on
a scale. One extreme would be to have a huge fair use doctrine. Free
speech would be tremendous, and individuals, companies, and news
agencies could report and say whatever they wanted without any
consequences or potential copyright infringement lawsuits. Under this
scenario very few news stories would be written due to a lack of incentive
for reporters to write iftheir words could simply be taken verbatim without
any remedy available. In contrast, the other extreme would be a world
without a fair use doctrine. Free speech would be limited, and people
would be required to have licenses to use any idea, quote, or even a single
fact from another's work. There would be more than enough incentive for
reporters to research and write stories, but ideas would not be disseminated
due to high transaction costs. Neither one of these extremes exists today,
nor are they being proposed. This article merely suggests a slight tip of the
scale in the second direction. The change is necessary due to a lack of top
notch investigative news stories in the market, and can be applied easily
by lowering transaction costs, and the ease in information being
transmitted quickly in today's high-tech world.
B. What Power Would Congress Use?
After the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Feist, clarifying that
under no circumstances may facts be copyrighted,247 Congress may have
potential constitutional limitations in enacting an amendment to the
Copyright Act as described. Subsequently a review of Congress's
copyright power as well as additional sources of congressional power is
necessary.
The Feistopinion's repeated invocation of constitutional constraints on
copyright protection of information has been criticized for erecting
"unnecessary ifnot insuperable barriers to alternative sources ofprotection
'
for information."248
Commentators have argued that the "Supreme
Court['s] review of these kinds of congressional findings [ ] should be
' however, the Court has proceeded differently.
extremely deferential,"249
In
the context of the Patent-Copyright clause, the Court had previously
announced considerable deference to congressional definitions of the

247. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
248. Ginsburg II, supra note 142, at 341.
249. Id. at 375.
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content and scope of the limited monopoly. 250 In Feist though, the
Supreme Court suggests that "the Constitution has become less
'permissive' as to Congress' authority to determine the content of its
power.,

251

The most recent decision concerning copyright law and congress's
power may show the Court moving away from the dicta stated in Feist.In
Eldredv. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court deferred to Congress's judgment in
declaring that the Copyright Term Extension Act met the "limited times"
requirement of the Copyright Clause.252 While citing an earlier opinion, the
Court held that "[i]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining
the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors.., in
order to give the public appropriate access to their work product., 253 The
Court went on to state that Congress must have a rational basis in
exercising its authority,254 and that the preamble of the Clause (which
states that copyright protection must be to "promote the Progress of
Science") "is not a substantive limit on Congress' legislative power."255
The Court concluded its opinion in Eldredby stating that "the Copyright
Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes
that... will serve the ends of the Clause. 256
Even if Congress cannot use its Copyright Clause power to protect
information in the manner described in this Article, it may be able to
legislate under the broader Commerce Clause. While the more specific
Copyright Clause would limit the more general Commerce Clause,
Congress might have the power to enact a misappropriation statute if the
law set forth a scheme of protection qualitatively different from a
copyright regime. Trademarks, which are legislated under the Commerce
Clause,"' supply a pertinent analogy. Since the information protection
here differs substantially from current copyright protection with respect to
the short time period, the legislation may not be seen as equivalent to
copyright, and subsequently allowable.

250. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972) ("[t]he direction of
Art[icle] I is that Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go
can come only from Congress.").
251. Ginsburg II, supra note 142, at 376.
252. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003).
253. Id. at 205 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
254. Id. at 205 n. 10.
255. Id. at 211.
256. Id. at 222.
257. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETmON
§ 5.3, at 5-6 (4th ed. 2008).
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Overall, the Eldred holding should provide Congress with ample
leeway to enact a change in copyright law to protect hot news.
Nevertheless, since Feist,commentators have theorized on broader powers
of Congress that would be available to protect information. Those theories
would generally
apply to the methods described here for protecting hot
25 8
news.
C. FirstAmendment Challenges
In addition to constitutional limitations restricting the power of
Congress, the First Amendment may pose a hurdle as well. "Generally,
copyright does not significantly interfere with first amendment values
because it protects only the form of expression contained in the
copyrighted work," while allowing the author's ideas to circulate freely.259
However, granting reporters a twenty-four hour monopoly on their story's
facts could stand as a major upset to First Amendment rights and may even
be considered a prior restraint.
The key to protection of hot news being compatible with the First
Amendment is that not-for-profit copying and disbursement of the
information would be allowed, and injunctions would not be a possible
remedy. The worst punishment an infringer could face is reimbursing the
twenty-four hour news owner for the lost profits associated with the
unlicensed use. Also, this proposed protection would in no way restrict
later authors from using a previous author's facts or work for a parody, so
long as that use was not for profit.
When comparing property interests granted by the Copyright Clause to
freedoms associated with the First Amendment, two considerations
arise.26 ° First, one should consider whether the Copyright Clause is a
limited exception to the First Amendment, or whether it is compatible. If
copyright were an exception to the First Amendment, then proprietary
rights in information could not coexist with the First Amendment outside
the copyright scheme.26 ' "If copyright does not constitute the only
permissible source of information protection, then its coverage of
information need not be tightly limited."262 Second, a statute to protect hot
news and the First Amendment share certain goals. Both seek to protect
258. See Ginsburg II, supranote 142, at 369 (For a more detailed discussion of broader powers
of Congress applied to protecting information).
259. Denicola, supra note 67, at 540.
260. Ginsburg II, supra note 142, at 385.
261. Id.("As a result, informational subject matter outside the scope of copyright could not
be protected against copying."
262. Id.
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the progress of knowledge and flow of information: the statute through
incentive for gathering information, and "the First Amendment through the
principle of the public interest in access to information., 263 "[T]he
incentive and access principles must be kept in balance. ' 26 If access were
to overbear, "the resulting diminution of incentives might lead to the
production of fewer works to which to gain access. '265
When tailoring this statute, or any statute, to attenuate First
Amendment objections, the effect of limiting protection against for-profit
commercial copying is key. "Imposing liability only on other compilers [of
news] addresses the main economic actors," while still allowing free
speech over the subject matter.26 Another method of tailoring the statute
could be to require compulsory licenses. 267 "This device ensures other
compilers access to the information, albeit for a fee. Once access is
available, however, the First Amendment does not necessarily command
that it be gratis. 2 68 Finally, a statute granting hot news protection might
promote First Amendment interests by offering later users an incentive to
disseminate to recover their licensing fee. In this respect, the First
Amendment goals would certainly be accomplished as well as the
inducement for gathering the news.
The Supreme Court's depiction of the relationship between the
Copyright Clause and First Amendment in Eldredmay also shed light on
how the Court would view a statute protecting hot news. 269 In Eldred,the
Court stated that "[t]he Copyright Clause and First Amendment were
adopted close in time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers' view,
copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with free speech
principles. 27° While the court continued to state that the Act's distinction
between idea and expression "strikes a definitional balance between the
First Amendment and the Copyright Act,, 271 it concluded: "when...
Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection,

263. Id.at 386.
264. Id.(quotes authority directly).
265. Id.
266. Ginsburg II, supranote 142, at 386 (while Prof. Ginsburg is referring to compilations of
facts, the parallel to news related facts can be easily drawn.).
267. Id.
268. Id.at 386-87.
269. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
270. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219. Additionally, legislative intent for the first Copyright Act
included protecting facts just as much as expression. Gorman, supra note 99, at 564.
271. Eldred,537 U.S. at 219 (citing Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
556 (1985)).

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLA W& POLICY

[Vol. 13

further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary. ' The Court generally
continued its post-Feist tradition of deferring to Congress for copyright
specifics.2 73 If this same reasoning continues, the Court would most likely
respond similarly to a new Act by Congress protecting hot news.
D. Possible Problems and Other Solutions
In addition to potential constitutional scrutiny problems associated with
a statute protecting hot news, other feasibility issues may arise as well.
Larry Kramer,274 the former president of CBS digital media and former
Editor of the San FranciscoExaminer, commented that "the press needs
to feed off each other on controversial stories., 275 Kramer cites examples
of large stories in the last fifty years, like Watergate, and states that
"without that added boost [of other newspapers publishing the articles], the
story could have very well died on the vine. 2 76 Kramer goes on further to
address the difficulty in defining "hot news," and states that "[e]nforcing
27 7
new 'fair use' laws for the Internet in general is the way to go.
Professor Bergman, 278 on the other hand, agrees that "the originators of the
information have to find an economic model where they can recoup profits
from their trouble," but does not necessarily agree or disagree with this
proposal. 279 Like Kramer, he is concerned with the enforceability of the
proposal, but adds that "the economic potential of the web is not going to
pay for quality journalism as we know it.""28 Professor Bergman would
like to see "rewards" for news research and development but is unsure how
281
best to structure the process.
Overall, most leaders in the field of journalism, and journalists
themselves, seem to agree that bottom-line pressures and profits are
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seriously hurting" the quality of news coverage.28 2 While this proposal
may have minor workability issues associated with its function-which
would only last for twenty-four hours-it would transform bottom-line
profits from hurting news coverage to helping it. The impact would be
most profound on the Internet, where the free flow of information and ease
in re-posting stories within a twenty-four hour period is most prevalent.
However, the enforceability of and compliance with the proposal is
actually easiest on the Internet--one can simply link to the original
author's story online. In sum, the benefits outweigh the potential problems,
and the risk of legislative inaction to aide this "fourth branch of
government" 28 3 is too great.
VII. CONCLUSION
The quality ofjournalism in the twenty-first century is declining. Only
a handful of large media companies and investors own the few national
newspapers left in the country, and they are demanding that profits
increase. The popularity of the Internet and its effect on news gathering
and local newspaper earnings has been damaging. The predicament is not
improving, with the current business solution moving toward having fewer
news gathering journalists.
In order to save the news and the diverse flow of information myriad
reporters provide, the legislature must intervene. The government can
stimulate the media directly-through direct control--or attempt to
stimulate news gathering through economic means. While the proposal
described in this article is not flawless, it would allow the media to
generate profits and bottom-line revenues through the news. Business
leaders and investors will align their companies to create the most profits,
and if profits are allowed to come from top notch reporting, then that is
what the future will hold.
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